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There can be no doubt that our Nation has had a long and unfortu-
nate history of sex discrimination. Traditionally, such discrimina-
tion was rationalized by an attitude of 'romantic paternalism' which,
in practical effect, put women not on a pedestal, but in a cage...
As a result of notions such as these, our statute books gradually
became laden with gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes
and, indeed, throughout much of the 19th century the position of
women in our society was, in many respects, comparable to that of
blacks under the pre-Civil War slave Codes.
Justice William Brennan'
I. INTRODUCTION
Until the commencement of the Clinton Administration, 2 women
1. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-85 (1973).
2. The Clinton administration's pro-choice views stand in sharp contrast to the vehement
pro-life agendas of the Reagan and Bush administrations. Clinton supports fetal tissue
research and testing of the French abortion pill, RU 486. Roll Call: House of Representatives,
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were fighting a losing battle against pro-life forces for the right to
choose an abortion. The battle has reached a stage of historic propor-
tion. Two successive Republican administrations stacked the
Supreme Court with Justices believed to be antagonistic3 to Roe v.
Wade.' Even after recognizing a woman's right to an abortion as fun-
damental in Roe, the Supreme Court joined the fray by chipping away
at that right with decisions limiting its scope.5
With the repeal of Roe seemingly imminent, both pro-choice and
pro-life factions have stepped up their political activity. On the pro-
life side, the activity has come to resemble "terrorism," 6 giving new
meaning to the phrase "women in combat."7 A case in point is the
Fatal Tissue Research, Los ANGELES TIMES, Mar. 18, 1993, part 5, at 4; see French Abortion
Pill Duefor U.S. Tests, Firm Says, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 18, 1993, at N18. In addition, he supports
two major pieces of legislation now pending in Congress: the first is the Freedom of Choice
Bill, H.R. 25, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) which would reinforce the Supreme Court's ruling
in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), legalizing abortion, and greatly limit the scope of state
abortion regulations. Kevin Merida, Doctor's Slaying Spurs Abortion-Rights Lawmakers,
WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 1993, at A 1. The second piece of legislation pending is the Freedom of
Access to Clinic Entrances Bill, H.R. 796, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) which would make it a
federal crime to blockade abortion clinics. The bill reads, in part:
Whoever, with intent to prevent or discourage any person from obtaining
reproductive health services, intentionally and physically obstructs, hinders, or
impedes the ingress or egress of another to a medical facility that affects
interstate commerce, or to the structure or place in which the medical facility is
located, shall be subject to the penalties provided in subsection (b) of this section
[a fine, or imprisonment for not more than one year, in the case of a first
conviction under this section, and not more than three years, in the case of a
previous conviction] and the civil remedy provided in subsection (c) of this
section [treble damages or $5000 in damages, whichever is greater, appropriate
declaratory or injunctive or other equitable relief, and attorney's fees].
Id. A specific provision excepts expression guaranteed by the First Amendment and labor
disputes from the bill's coverage.
In addition, President Clinton's appointment of Janet Reno as Attorney General, who is
pro-choice, marks "a sharp reversal from the policies of the Justice Department under Presi-
dents Ronald Reagan and George Bush, who used the department as an instrument of their
opposition to abortion." David Johnston, Attorney General Weighs Greater Federal Role in
Abortion Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1993, at A6.
3. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747
(1986) (White, J., dissenting); Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416
(1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (White, J., dissenting).
4. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
5. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); Rust v.
Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
6. Ellen Goodman, The New Domestic Terrorists, BOST. GLOBE, Mar. 14, 1993, at A25.
7. It is important to note that although it is women whose constitutional rights are at
stake, pro-life violence is perpetrated against men as well. Perhaps the most extreme example
is the recent murder of Dr. David Gunn outside of a Pensacola, Florida clinic, during an anti-




organized blockading of abortion clinics in cities such as Los Angeles,
Chicago, Washington D.C., New York, Wichita, and Buffalo.' In
these cities, the anti-abortion movement, spearheaded by Operation
Rescue9 and its founder, Randall Terry, continued its crusade to pre-
vent women from exercising their constitutional right to abortion.
Operation Rescue follows a three-part plan of attack to achieve
its aims: (1) it uses blockades of human bodies to shut down targeted
clinics through mob intimidation, (2) it teaches the blockaders tactics
to use with police on the scene in order to stymie police efforts to
uphold trespass laws once a blockade has begun, and (3) it instructs
its followers to refuse to give their names once arrested, leading to the
clogging of local jails and court systems 0 so as to effectively frustrate
the efforts of the legal system to process the huge numbers of law
breakers. Using the three-prong plan, pro-lifers successfully conspire
to thwart the efforts of local law enforcement officials who seek to
preserve for women the freedom to exercise their constitutional right
to seek an abortion.
One hundred and twenty years ago, in the Reconstruction South,
a similar conspiracy was perpetrated against newly freed slaves in
Southern states. Southern opponents of the Republican government
formed the Ku Klux Klan and similar White Supremacist groups,'"
which aimed to deprive newly freed Blacks of their rights, recognized
8. For newspaper accounts of abortion clinic violence in these cities, see Lynne Duke &
Michael Abramowitz, Anti-Abortion Protesters Blockade Clinic in Va., WASH. POST, Oct. 30,
1988, at B1; Maureen Dowd, Bush Chides Protesters on 'Excesses', N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1991,
§ I at 7; Ku Klux Klan Statute Is Right Law in Wichita, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1991, at A26;
'Summer of Mercy' Costs in Wichita, USA TODAY, Feb. 19, 1992 at 4A; Barbara Whitaker,
320 Anti-Abortion Protesters Arrested, NEWSDAY, May 7, 1988, at 11.
9. Operation Rescue was the driving force behind abortion clinic blockades since its
inception in 1986. Due to increasing political pressure and heavy court fines, Operation
Rescue disbanded its national operations and has since splintered into a series of local anti-
abortion organizations. See David A. Gardey, Note, Federal Power to the Rescue: The Use of
§ 1985(3) Against Anti-Abortion Protesters, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 707, 708 nn. 10-11
(1992); Dawn W. Ceol, Supreme Court to Hear Va. Abortion Clinic Case, WASH. TIMES, Feb.
26, 1991, at A3; see also Tamar Lewin, With Thin Staff and Thick Debt, Anti-Abortion Group
Faces Struggle, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1990, at A16.
10. For a description of how Operation Rescue demonstrations burden a court system, see
Felicity Barringer, Abortion Foes Clog Vermont Courts, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1990, at A12.
11. The Klan was one of several White Supremacist groups operating in the postbellum
South, committing terrorist acts against newly freed Blacks and Republicans. Other groups
included Knights of the White Camelia, the White Brotherhood, the Pale Faces, and the '76
Association. Mark Fockele, Comment, A Construction of Section 1985(c) in Light of Its
Original Purpose, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 402, 407-08 n.29 (1979).
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under the Thirteenth,1 2 Fourteenth,' 3 and Fifteenth' 4 Amendments to
the United States Constitution. Congress passed these amendments in
the wake of the Civil War in order to guarantee Blacks throughout
the country the right to be free from bondage, the right to due process
and equal protection of the laws, and the right to vote.15 Opponents
of these amendments fought to nullify them through private conspira-
cies designed to intimidate and coerce Blacks, their supporters, and
Republican officials. 16 In response, the forty-second Congress of the
United States passed the Ku Klux Klan Act,'7 section two of which
was designed to provide a civil remedy against the growing violence
by the Ku Klux Klan. Section two of the Act read as follows:
If two or more persons ... shall conspire together ... for the
purpose, either directly or indirectly, of depriving any person or
class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
12. The Thirteenth Amendment states:
1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for a
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. 2. Congress shall have
the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, §§ 1-2.
13. The Fourteenth Amendment reads, in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id. at amend. XIV, § 1.
14. The Fifteenth Amendment reads:
1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.
2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
Id. at amend. XV, § 1-2.
15. While these amendments were passed in response to racial terrorism in the Southern
states, the Fourteenth Amendment has subsequently been construed, in accordance with its
broad language, to protect the rights of individuals other than Blacks. See, e.g., Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (disapproving discrimination of women for purely
administrative convenience).
16. Randolph M. Scott-McLaughlin, Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic: The
Supreme Court's Next Opportunity to Unsettle Civil Rights Law, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1357, 1361-
71 (1992).
17. The original act was named "An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and For Other Purposes." Ch. 22, 17
Stat. 13 (1871) (current version 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1993)). The act included seven sections.
Some of the other sections created the following: a prohibition against deprivations of rights
secured by the Constitution under color of state law; a provision allowing the President of the
United States to call out the militia, land and naval forces in the case of insurrection, domestic
violence, unlawful combinations or conspiracies; and a provision which allows the President,
when such an insurrection becomes a rebellion, to suspend the privileges of habeas corpus
under specific circumstances. Id. §§ 1-2, 4.
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privileges or immunities under the laws . . . if any one or more
persons engaged [therein] do, or cause to be done, any act in fur-
therance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby [another is]
injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exer-
cising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the
person so injured or deprived ... may have ... an action for the
recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation,
against any one or more [of the conspirators]."8
For 120 years following the Act's passage, federal judges have
struggled to apply the statute, which is now codified as 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3),19 in a way that is consistent with the intent of the authors
of the bill. Most recently, abortion clinics, under siege by anti-abor-
tion protestors, have brought suits under § 1985(3) to prevent the
mob violence perpetrated by Operation Rescue and other anti-abor-
tion groups from taking place outside abortion clinics in the United
States.
By asking for protection under this statute, abortion clinics draw
an analogy between pro-lifers' intimidation tactics directed toward
women and the Ku Klux Klan's terrorism of Blacks and their sup-
porters in the Reconstruction South. Operation Rescue's founder,
Randall Terry, frankly admits the objectives of the organization's
activities:"° to prevent women from exercising their constitutionally-
mandated right to seek abortions and abortion-related services; to pre-
vent clinics which provide such services from operating;21 and, finally,
18. 17 Stat. 13-14 (1871).
19. The current version of § 1985(3) reads as follows:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the
highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either
directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the
laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws or for the purpose of
preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from
giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal
protection of the laws.... If one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to
be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another
is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any
right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or
deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such
injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1992).
20. Women's Health Care Servs. v. Operation Rescue-Nat'l, No. 91-1303-K, 1991 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14521, at 38 ("The defendants have concededly engaged in criminal activity.
Counsel has admitted that 'no doubt,' the activities of Operation Rescue include violation of
trespass laws and possible violations of state tort law. Thus, as counsel for defendant
Operation Rescue-National has admitted to the court, Operation Rescue functions by calling
upon its adherents to break the law.").
21. See RANDALL TERRY, OPERATION RESCUE, NATIONAL DAY OF RESCUE-OCTOBER
29 (1988).
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to force the reversal of Roe v. Wade and rescind a woman's right to an
abortion, by constitutional amendment, if possible.22
The Supreme Court had an opportunity to offer § 1985(3) pro-
tection to women victimized by clinic blockaders in Bray v. Alexan-
dria Women's Health Clinic.23 Instead, five members of the Court
construed the statute and criteria for protection narrowly and held
that: (1) "women seeking abortions" were not a protected class under
§ 1985(3);24 (2) even if they were, abortion protestors' activities did
not constitute class-based animus because a "sex-based intent" did not
underlie their actions;25 and, (3) even if (1) and (2) were satisfied, the
protesters did not violate the plaintiffs' constitutionally protected
right to travel 26 or to seek an abortion.27
Part II of this Comment will review the statutory history of the
Ku Klux Klan Act and the evolution of its class-based animus and
state involvement requirements, to show that victims of abortion
clinic violence are precisely the type that 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) was
designed to protect. The Supreme Court's historic espousal of a nega-
tive rights28 approach to constitutional interpretation has eviscerated
the protections intended by the forty-second Congress in promulgat-
ing § 1985(3). Part III considers pro-lifers' activities, and the abor-
tion context generally, in order to illustrate the similarities between
abortion clinic violence and Klan terrorism. Part IV will discuss
§ 1985(3) cases in the federal courts and the various degrees of suc-
cess the plaintiff clinics have achieved. This discussion centers
around the Supreme Court's decision in Bray. This Part evaluates the
current state of the class-based animus -requirement and considers
whether the interference with a woman's right to abortion constitutes
gender-based discrimination directed at women as a class and there-
fore is protected by § 1985(3). Further, Part IV discusses the state
involvement requirement implied through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment language of the statute and how it has been interpreted to affect
§ 1985(3) suits under the doctrines underlying the right to travel and
right to an abortion.
22. See ROSALIND POLLACK PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMAN'S CHOICE: THE
STATE, SEXUALITY, AND REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM 241 (1990).
23. 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
24. Id. at 759.
25. Id. at 759-60.
26. Id. at 762-63.
27. Id. at 764.
28. See generally Michael J. Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of Slaughter-House: A Critique
of a Negative Rights View of the Constitution, 43 VAND. L. REV. 409 (1990) (challenging the
accuracy and intellectual foundations of the negative rights view of the U.S. constitution).
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II. THE INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE Ku KLUX KLAN ACT
A. Legislative History
The period of history immediately following the Civil War was
one of great consternation for the forty-second Congress. The polit-
ical situation in the Reconstruction South was rife with violence
against Southern Blacks and Republicans, which Congress, upon
investigation, suspected was politically motivated.29 It is important to
note that, at the time of the passage of the Ku Klux Klan Act, the
Klan was a political, as well as racist, organization. 30 The Klan was
generally thought of as a tool of the Democratic party, directing its
violence not only at Blacks, but also at supporters and enforcers of
Republican policies. 31 The belief that the Ku Klux Klan Act was
designed only to protect Blacks oversimplifies its historic context. In
fact, the drafters of the bill intended to proscribe conspiracies against
the person, property, and liberty of individuals 32 generally, although
this proscription was in response to violence directed at Blacks and
Republicans.
3
Although the offenses committed by the Klan were violations of
state law, the states were either unwilling or unable to successfully
prevent Klan activities. 34  Klan members allegedly threatened and
intimidated local judiciaries to prevent the bringing of suits against
others Klan members.35
President Ulysses S. Grant, recognizing the danger of political
lawlessness in the unstable South, requested legislation from Congress
giving him additional authority to control "[a] condition of affairs
[that] ... exists in some of the states of the Union rendering life and
property insecure. . ,3. In response to this plea from the President,
Representative Samuel Shellabarger formulated a legislative package,
promulgated as "H.R. No. 320, To Enforce the Provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States."137
The proposal was aimed at conspiracies like the Klan, which Con-
29. Fockele, supra note 11, at 408; Scott-McLaughlin, supra note 16.
30. Fockele, supra note 11, at 403; Scott-McLaughlin, supra note 16, at 1364.
31. See Ken Gormley, Private Conspiracies and the Constitution: A Modern Vision of 42
U.S.C. Section 1985(3), 64 TEX. L. REV. 527, 535 (1985); see also Scott-McLaughlin, supra
note 16; Brian J. Gaj, Note, Section 1985(2) and its Scope, 70 CONN. L. REV. 756, 758 (1985).
32. Fockele, supra note 11; see notes 183-87 and accompanying text.
33. Fockele, supra note 11.
34. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 321 (1871) [hereinafter CONG. GLOBE]; see
Gormley, supra note 31, at 535; Scott-McLaughlin, supra note 16, at 1368-69.
35. Scott-McLaughlin, supra note 16, at 1369 n.42 and accompanying text.
36. CONG. GLOBE, supra note 34, at 236, col. 1.
37. Id. at 317. For synopsis of some of the other sections of the act, see supra note 17.
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gress believed were aimed at overthrowing the Reconstruction poli-
cies of the Republican Congress. 38 Forty-two U.S.C. § 1985(3) is the
descendant of section two of Shellabarger's legislative package, which
was originally intended to operate as a criminal sanction against con-
spirators "do[ing] any act[s] in violation of the rights, privileges or
immunities of another person .. . . 39 However, many members of
the forty-second Congress maintained that such a law would be an
unconstitutional invasion of the states' inherent jurisdiction over
crimes.' Therefore, Shellabarger amended the bill, limiting its scope
only to civil conspiracies. 41
B. Judicial History
The effectiveness of § 1985(3) has waxed and waned with judicial
interpretive whimsy. Shortly after the passage of the Ku Klux Klan
Act in 1871, the Supreme Court decided the Slaughter-House Cases,42
which severely limited the scope of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, and by implication, the scope of § 1985(3). In Slaughter-
House, a group of Louisiana butchers challenged a Louisiana law
granting a 25-year monopoly over the slaughter of cattle in several
Louisiana parishes to a single corporation. The Supreme Court
rejected the butchers' claim that such a statute deprived them of their
rights under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, saying that the
right of the butchers to carry on business was not incident to national
citizenship.43 Therefore, the Supreme Court left it up to the states to
protect this fundamental right-not the federal government.
Although § 1985(3) was not applied in the Slaughter-House Cases, the
statute's scope was necessarily limited by implication, since by its lan-
guage § 1985(3) protected against conspiracies which infringed upon
rights guaranteed under the Privileges and Immunities Clause."
The decision in Slaughter-House marked the acceptance of a neg-
38. Gormley, supra note 31, at 535; see also Scott-McLaughlin, supra note 16, at 1368 n.41
(quoting remarks of Representative Jeremiah M. Wilson).
39. Janis McDonald, Starting From Scratch: A Revisionist View of 42 U.S. C. § 1985(3)
and Class-Based Animus, 19 CONN. L. REV. 471, 480 (1987) (quoting from CONG. GLOBE,
supra note 34, at app. 68).
40. CONG. GLOBE, supra note 34, at 366.
41. See Alfred Avins, The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871: Some Reflected Light On State
Action and The Fourteenth Amendment, II ST. Louis U. L.J. 331, 351 (1967); McDonald,
supra note 39, at 478.
42. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
43. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment reads: No state
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
44. Gormley, supra note 31.
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ative rights perspective toward the Fourteenth Amendment.45 Under
such a theory, the federal government was empowered to protect
against state deprivation of, but not to facilitate individuals' exercise
of, fundamental rights under the Privileges and Immunities Clause.46
The Court rejected a broader interpretation of the clause because of
the potential impact on federalism. They feared giving the federal
government too much power, which could have drastic "conse-
quences [for] . . . the structure and spirit of our institutions."47
This perspective on federalism, in which the States are viewed as
the most reliable guarantors of civil rights and the federal government
must be held in check, emerged as an outdated one after the Recon-
struction experience. As the thirty-ninth Congress, which drafted the
Fourteenth Amendment, realized,4" the States were unable or unwill-
ing to ensure the civil rights of citizens in the South. Justice Swayne,
dissenting in Slaughter-House, noted that "[the] mischief to be reme-
died [by the Fourteenth Amendment] was not merely slavery and its
... consequences; but that spirit of insubordination and disloyalty to
the National government which had troubled the country for so many
years in some of the States." 49
Nevertheless, in Slaughter-House the Court adopted a negative
rights approach to constitutional law generally and toward the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause specifically. This spilled over into the
Court's interpretation of § 1985(3) and severely limited the statute's
effectiveness in guaranteeing civil rights.
After Slaughter-House, the Supreme Court decided United States
v. Harris-0 and further limited protection under § 1985(3) by limiting
the Fourteenth Amendment's scope to cases involving affirmative
state action.5' The facts of Harris involved the brutal attack by a
group of twenty Whites on four Blacks in the custody of a Tennessee
sheriff. One of the victims died. The plaintiffs relied on the criminal
45. Gerhardt, supra note 28, at 409. Negative rights theory has been justly criticized as
relying on a view of Constitutional neutrality, which itself is controversial. See Cass R.
Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With Special Reference to Pornography, Abortion,
and Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 8-9 (1992). Sunstein notes that "the line between
constitutionally protected rights and unprotected interests depends not on the distinction
between negative and positive rights, but on substantive ideas about what government
normally or naturally does." Id. at 9.
46. See generally Gerhardt, supra note 28.
47. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 78.
48. Gerhardt, supra note 28, at 417.
49. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 129 (Swayne, J., dissenting); see Scott-
McLaughlin, supra note 16, at 1362.
50. 106 U.S. 629 (1883).
51. The statutory language of § 1985(3) parallels the language of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Compare supra note 13 with supra note 19.
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conspiracy language of the Ku Klux Klan Act in pursuing their cause
of action.5 2 The Supreme Court held that the Federal government
had no power under the Fourteenth Amendment to address private
acts of violence as federal crimes. The Court therefore ruled that the
section of the Act which imposed criminal penalties was an unconsti-
tutional infringement on the States' exclusive jurisdiction over crimi-
nal acts.5 3
It is important to note that the enactment of the Ku Klux Klan
Act of 1871 occurred prior to the Supreme Court's decision in the
Slaughter House Cases limiting the scope of the Privileges and Immu-
nities Clause.5 4 The timing of the passage of the Act vis-a-vis the
cases interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment indicate that in 1871
Congress did not fully appreciate the Supreme Court's perception of
the constitutional limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment. There is
the possibility, indeed probability, that Congress intended § 1985(3)
to remedy a broader range of civil rights violations than that which
the Supreme Court later proposed. 55
C. Modern Application
1. COLLINS V. HARDYMAN
Because the Supreme Court had so restricted the Act's applica-
tion in Harris, Slaughter-House, and the Civil Rights Cases, § 1985(3)
52. The criminal conspiracy language was originally part of section 2 and read as follows:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise upon
the highway or on the premises of another person or class of persons for the
purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any of equal privileges or
immunities under the laws, or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the
constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all
persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws, each of
said persons shall be punished by a fine of not less than $500 nor more than
$5000, or by imprisonment, with or without hard labor, not less than six months
nor more than six years, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
17 Stat. 13-14 (1871).
53. Harris, 106 U.S. at 638-39. The Harris Court also addressed whether the criminal
conspiracy language was constitutional under the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The
Court said that the law exceeded Congress' authority under the Thirteenth Amendment which
prohibited slavery. Id. at 641; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, §§ 1-2. In doing so, the Court
relied on the assertion that the law protected Whites as well as Blacks, a proposition later
invalidated under the "class based animus" requirement. See infra notes 74-78, 92-95 and
accompanying text. The Court also said the statute exceeded Congress' authority under the
Fifteenth Amendment, "whose sole object [was] to protect . . . the right of citizens of the
United States to vote." Harris, 106 U.S. at 637.
54. McDonald, supra note 39, at 491.
55. Indeed, commentators argue that Congress intended the Fourteenth Amendment and
legislation passed under it to protect a broader range of civil rights than the Supreme Court
historically has permitted. See Gerhardt, supra note 28, at 417-19; Gormley, supra note 31, at
534-41; McDonald, supra note 39, at 475-92.
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went virtually unused from the date of its passage until 1951. In that
year, the Supreme Court heard Collins v. Hardyman,56 a case that
involved a dispute between two feuding political factions in Califor-
nia. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants, in breaking up a polit-
ical meeting, conspired to deprive plaintiffs of their rights to assemble
and to equal privileges and immunities, and brought the action under
§ 1985(3)." The Court rejected the plaintiffs' argument, saying the
action could only be brought in state court, since under the Four-
teenth Amendment, the federal government had no power to legislate
acts which did not involve state action. 8 The Court wrote an inten-
tionally vague opinion,59 generally understood as holding that state
action is a necessary element of § 1985(3),60 a requirement that, at
least technically speaking, has subsequently been overruled. 61 Despite
their restrictive reading of the statute, the Collins Court sparked new
interest in the statute as a device for safeguarding civil rights at the
federal level, albeit 80 years after its enactment.62
2. GRIFFIN V. BRECKENRIDGE
Twenty years after the Supreme Court imposed a state action
requirement in Collins, the Court overruled it in Griffin v. Brecken-
ridge. 63 Griffin involved the invocation of § 1985(3) against two
White males who violently assaulted three Black men in an automo-
bile because they believed one of them to be a civil rights worker. 
6
The district court dismissed the complaint, stating that the plaintiffs
failed to meet the Collins state action requirement. 65 The Fifth Cir-
cuit affirmed, 66 although expressing "serious doubts" as to the "con-
tinued vitality" of Collins and the state action requirement.67 The
56. 341 U.S. 651 (1951).
57. Id. at 654. § 1985(3) was then numbered 8 U.S.C. § 47(3).
58. 341 U.S. at 637-39.
59. Neil H. Cogan, Section 1985(3)'s Restructuring of Equality: An Essay on Texts,
History, Progress, and Cynicism, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 515, 525 (1987).
60. Gormley, supra note 31, at 546; Fockele, supra note 11, at 422; Gaj, supra note 31, at
762.
61. The state action requirement in Collins was overruled in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403
U.S. 88, 101-02 (1971); see infra notes 63-77 and accompanying text. However, later cases
have required "state involvement" in § 1985(3) claims when based on a fundamental right
guaranteed only against state interference by the Fourteenth Amendment. See United Bhd. of
Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 832-34 (1983); infra notes 79-88 and
accompanying text.
62. Gormley, supra note 31, at 546-47.
63. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
64. Id. at 90-91.
65. Id. at 93.
66. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 410 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1969).
67. Id. at 834.
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Supreme Court reversed, holding that § 1985(3) encompassed private
conspiracies, and was not limited to instances of state action as
required by Collins. Justice Stewart's opinion noted that section one
of the Ku Klux Klan Act,68 now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, pro-
vided a cause of action when state action was involved, 69 and section
two of the Act was directed at private conspiracies.70 The Court
noted that if burdened with a state action requirement, § 1985(3)
would be devoid of any independent effect, since state-sponsored
activity was actionable under § 1983. 7' The Griffin Court found it
"almost impossible to believe that Congress intended" to duplicate
the coverage of one or more of the sections. 72 In finding for the plain-
tiffs, the Court enumerated the four criteria necessary to bring a suc-
cessful action under § 1985(3): a complainant must allege (1) a
conspiracy (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indi-
rectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the
laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) an
act in furtherance of the conspiracy, (4) whereby a person is either
injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege
of a citizen of the United States.73
The Court also recognized, however, that a violation of §
1985(3) was not intended to give rise to a general federal tort action.
Absent the limiting effect of the state action requirement of Collins,
the provision could be mistakenly interpreted as providing a tort rem-
edy. Therefore, the court stressed that the forty-second Congress
intended to limit the scope of the Act to "some racial, or perhaps
otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the
conspirators' action."' 74  The Court, in subsequent cases,75 has
expressly declined to decide whether class-based animus other than
racial bias would be actionable under § 1985(3).76 Since Griffin was
decided, federal courts have repeatedly struggled with this issue. The
68. See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
69. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 99 (1971).
70. Id. at 98-99. Section 3 of the act was directed at massive private lawlessness which
rendered state authorities powerless, calling for use of military forces. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 99.
73. Id. at 102-03.
74. Id. at 102.
75. See, e.g., United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 836 (1983) ("[I]t
is a close question whether § 1985(3) was intended to reach any class-based animus other than
animus against Negroes and those who championed their cause, most notably Republicans.").
76. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102 n.9. For an exposition on the development of the class-based
animus requirement, see generally Devin S. Schindler, Comment, The Class Based Animus




majority of Circuits agree that other groups do qualify for protection
from class-based animus."" The Court reconsidered the class-based
animus requirement and the state action requirement in the next
landmark case involving § 1985(3), United Brotherhood of Carpenters
and Joiners v. Scott.78
3. UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS V. SCOTT
The Supreme Court in Scott intended to clarify earlier pro-
nouncements regarding the applicability of § 1985(3). 79 However, the
opinion added confusion to an already confusing body of case law. In
Scott, a government contractor hired non-union workers in a strongly
pro-union town.80 A citizen protest was staged that ended in fire and
violence against the non-union workers."' Continued violence was
threatened "if the non-union workers did not leave the area or con-
cede to union policies and principles. '8 2 The protest caused the con-
tractor to default on its government contract.8 3 The District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas, which identified the issue as whether
non-union employees constituted a class for purposes of the require-
ment of a class-based animus necessary to bring a claim under
§ 1985(3), held for the plaintiffs."4 The Fifth Circuit affirmed, inter-
preting the action as a claim that the employees' First Amendment
right to associate with a union had been violated."' Although the
defendants asserted that state action was necessary, the Fifth Circuit
denied this claim, citing Griffin as overruling the state action require-
77. See NOW v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990) (women seeking
abortions), overruled by Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993);
New York State NOW v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir.) (conspiracies "directed against
women are inherently invidious and repugnant"), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990); Volk v.
Coler, 845 F.2d 1422 (7th Cir. 1988) (sex, religion, ethnicity, and political loyalty); Conklin v.
Lovely, 834 F.2d 543 (6th Cir. 1987) (political beliefs); Stathos v. Bowden, 728 F.2d 15 (1st
Cir. 1984) (gender); Life Ins. Co. of North America v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1979)
(female purchasers of disability insurance); Conroy v. Conroy, 575 F.2d 175 (8th Cir. 1978),
vacated on other grounds, 442 U.S. 366 (1979) (gender); cf. Faucher v. Rodziewicz, 891 F.2d
864, 871 n.4 (11 th Cir. 1990) (question whether gender is a protected class left open); Azar v.
Conley, 456 F.2d 1382, 1386-87 n.5 (6th cir. 1972) ("middle class white family" might
constitute a protected class). But see Deubert v. Gulf Fed. Say. Bank, 820 F.2d 754, 757 (5th
Cir. 1987) (only conspiracies motivated by racial animus actionable under § 1985(3)); Knott
v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 389 F. Supp. 856 (E.D. Mo. 1975) (§ 1985(3) only protects
against racial discrimination), aj'd, 527 F.2d 1249 (8th Cir. 1975).
78. 463 U.S. 825 (1983).
79. Gormley, supra note 31, at 558.
80. Scott, 463 U.S. at 828.
81. Id.
82. Scott v. Moore, 461 F. Supp. 224, 227 (E.D. Tex. 1978).
83. Scott, 463 U.S. at 828.
84. Id. at 829.
85. Id. at 830.
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ment in Collins. 6 The Fifth Circuit further held that § 1985(3)
reached conspiracies against politically and economically defined
classes, as well as racial classes such as that protected in Griffin.87
The Supreme Court reversed. In a confusing discussion of appli-
cable precedent and constitutional doctrine, the Court held that a
§ 1985(3) claim based on the First Amendment requires "that the
state is involved in the conspiracy or that the aim of the conspiracy is
to influence the activity of the state."'8 8 The Court stated that "state
involvement" is necessary because the plaintiffs sought to protect a
right that is only protected by the Constitution insofar as it is
infringed upon by the state.8 9 Since § 1985(3) does not create new
rights, but only protects rights found elsewhere in the Constitution,90
a private deprivation of the right to associate was not found to be
actionable under § 1985(3). 91
Furthermore, the Court stated that even if there had been state
involvement, the claim could not be maintained, since it lacked the
requisite class-based animus.92 The Court stated that "it is a close
question whether § 1985(3) was intended to reach any class-based ani-
mus other than [racial animus]. 93 The Court stated that it certainly
was not intended to protect classes characterized by economic views,
status, or activities. 94 Because the court construed union affiliation, or
lack thereof, as an economic or commercial status, it was beyond the
purview of § 1985(3). 95
It is unclear how the "state involvement" required in Scott differs
from the state action requirement overruled by Griffin. Some courts
have construed the state involvement requirement as being less
demanding than the affirmative state action required in pure Four-
teenth Amendment cases.96 Indeed, some courts consider state inac-
tion, or interference with state authorities performing their police
functions, as sufficient to support a § 1985(3) claim.97 However, other
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 830.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 834.
91. Id. at 830-33.
92. Id. at 834.
93. Id. at 836.
94. Id. at 837.
95. Id. at 838-39.
96. In the abortion clinic cases, some federal courts have interpreted anti-abortionists'
interference with police efforts to maintain order as sufficient to constitute state involvement
for § 1985(3) purposes. See infra notes 150-61 and accompanying text.
97. However, such interference with state authorities is more effectively dealt with as a
violation of the "Hindrance Clause" of § 1985(3). For Justice Scalia's views on such a claim,
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courts adamantly refuse to recognize anything less than affirmative
state action as adequate for § 1985(3) purposes. This again means
that the two sections of the original Ku Klux Klan Act, now known
as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985(3), are essentially redundant.98  In
fact, § 1985(3) is narrower in scope than § 1983, since § 1983 requires
no proof of a conspiracy.
III. ANTI-ABORTION VIOLENCE TAKES TO THE STREETS
The violence perpetrated at abortion clinics by pro-life activists is
precisely the kind of mob intimidation that the forty-second Congress
intended to prevent by passing the Ku Klux Klan Act. Operation
Rescue and Randall Terry openly assert their unlawful aims,99 using
inflammatory language designed to instigate tension between the pro-
choice and pro-life factions. For example, Operation Rescue's litera-
ture pronounces that "while the child-killing facility is blockaded, no
one is permitted to enter past the rescuers . . . .Doctors, nurses,
patients, staff, abortion-bound women, families of abortion-bound
women-all are prevented from entering the abortuary while the res-
cue is in progress. " 1°° Operation Rescue defines "rescue" as "physi-
cally blockading abortion mills with (human) bodies, to intervene
between abortionists and the innocent victims."'1 ' The protesters can
strike anywhere, at any time, and refuse to give police any warning of
the impending disturbance, despite court orders to do so.102
A. Civil Disobedience
Anti-abortionists have sought to justify their behavior by classi-
fying their activities as akin to the "sit-ins" of the 1960s, "the classic
example of disobedience."'' 03 Operation Rescue defines its activities
using terms that ironically are associated with the civil rights move-
see Bray, 113 S. Ct. 753, 764-67 (1993). For the opposite side of the argument, see id. at 770-
71 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 795-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also infra note 132.
98. Under the "state involvement" rationale, the only instance where state involvement is
not required is when a right protected against private interference is implicated, i.e., the right
to travel. Because these instances are so rare, and so narrowly construed, see, e.g., Bray v.
Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753, 762-63 (1993), § 1983 and § 1985(3) are
essentially redundant.
99. Susan Faludi, The Antiabortion Crusade of Randy Terry: Operation Rescue's Jailed
Leader and His Feminist Roots, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 1989, at CI.
100. TERRY, supra note 21.
101. Id.
102. See New York State NOW v. Terry, 697 F. Supp. 1324, 1328 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
103. Bruce Ledewitz, Civil Disobedience, Injunctions, and The First Amendment, 19
HOFSTRA L. REV. 67, 68 (1990); see generally Charles E. Rice, Issues Raised By the Abortion
Rescue Movement, 23 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 15 (1989).
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ment: '°  free speech,10 5 freedom of assembly, and civil disobedi-
ence. ,06 Use of these terms obviously is misleading. By using them,
anti-abortion forces seek to hide the essence of their movement, which
is the deprivation of individuals' civil rights, not efforts to guarantee
them. 07
Generally, federal judges have recognized the distinction between
the pro-life movement and the civil rights movement pro-lifers
attempt to emulate with their rhetoric. In NOW v. Terry,'0° which
involved a § 1985(3) action against abortion blockaders, Judge
Cardamone of the Second Circuit stated that
[i]nsofar as appellants' rights of free speech were exercised in close
proximity to individual women entering or leaving the clinics so as
to tortiously assault or harass them, appellants' rights ended where
those women's rights began. There is no constitutional privilege to
assault or harass an individual or to invade another's personal
space.'0 9
As attorneys for the National Organization of Women (NOW) have
stressed, "What the courts below have enjoined is not speech, distrib-
uting leaflets, peaceful demonstration, or symbolic expressive con-
duct designed to persuade women not to exercise their constitutional
rights."' 10 Instead, the judge tailors the order so that "[t]he injunc-
tion restricts not legitimate rights of protest, but the tortious interfer-
104. See, e.g., Ledewitz, supra note 103; Rice, supra note 103.
105. See, e.g., Jerry Gray, Bill Shields Abortion Clinics From Protests, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23,
1991, at B6 (quoting the president of the New Jersey Right to Life Committee criticizing a bill
establishing a buffer zone around health care centers that would be legally off-limits to
protesters as creating a "muzzle zone" preventing people from "expressing their free speech."
An assemblyman in support of the bill responded that "[t]he anti-abortion groups can exercise
their free speech, but they do it from a distance.").
106. Civil disobedience is defined as "[a] form of lawbreaking employed to demonstrate the
injustice or unfairness of a particular law and indulged in deliberately to focus attention on the
allegedly undesirable law." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 245 (6th ed. 1990). On the other
hand, civil conspiracy is defined as "[a] combination of two or more persons who, by concerted
action, seek to accomplish an unlawful purpose or to accomplish some purpose, not in itself
unlawful, by unlawful means." Id. While § 1985(3) does not, on its face, prohibit civil
disobedience, it does address and provide a remedy for civil conspiracy.
107. Furthermore, Operation Rescue's claim that injunctive relief violates the
demonstrators' First Amendment right of free speech rings particularly hollow in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991). In Rust, the Court held
valid a regulation of the Department of Health and Human Services prohibiting employees in
federally funded clinics from discussing abortion as a family planning option with its patients.
Id. at 1764.
108. 886 F.2d 1339 (2nd Cir. 1989).
109. Id. at 1343.
110. Brief for Respondents at 7, Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753
(1993) (No. 90-985) (emphasis added).
1430
WOMEN UNDER SIEGE
ence with the rights of others."'II Women seeking abortions at clinics
where "rescues" are perpetrated often face hundreds of protesters,
long waits in parking lots, and the threat of medical complications
from deprivation of medical services as a result of the disruptions
instigated by Operation Rescue and its supporters.112 Protesters have
become more militant in recent years, going so far as to place children
under the wheels of cars to try to keep people out of the clinics. 
1 3
Protesters have chased patients outside abortion clinics, waved dis-
membered dolls splattered with red paint, and screamed epithets and
threats at patients and staff'114
Perhaps the most chilling example of anti-abortion violence is the
recent murder of Dr. David Gunn, who performed abortions at clinics
in the Pensacola area. Michael F. Griffin, a pro-life demonstrator,
shot Dr. Gunn three times in the back as the doctor arrived for work
during an anti-abortion demonstration. 1 5 While this is an extreme
example, it is indicative of a rise in the extremity of anti-abortion
violence. 1 16
A National Abortion Federation report stated that reported anti-
abortion vandalism more than doubled from 1991 to 1992, and cases
of arson rose from four in 1990 to twelve in 1992. 17 The Federation
further reported that twenty-seven incidents of anti-abortion violence
111. Women's Health Care Servs. v. Operation Rescue-Nat'l, 773 F. Supp. 258, 263 (D.
Kan. 1991).
112. See NOW v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1489-90 (E.D. Va. 1989), affid, 914
F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'd sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct.
753 (1993).
113. Gray, supra note 105.
114. ABORTION CLINIC VIOLENCE: OVERSIGHT HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON
CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 99th
Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 5-9 (1987) [hereinafter OVERSIGHT HEARINGS] (testimony of Mary
Bannecker and Heather Green).
115. Larry Rohter, Doctor is Slain During Protest Over Abortions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11,
1993, at Al.
116. Id. This is not to say that pro-life forces are condoning the murder of Dr. Gunn;
indeed, they have been quick to distance themselves from the incident. See Sara Rimer, The
Clinic Gunman and the Victim: Abortion Fight Reflected in Two Lives, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14,
1993, at A24. However, some of the anti-abortion advocates' responses are disturbing. For
example, while "Rescue America" states it does not condone the killing, its national director,
Don Treshman, was quoted as saying "[w]hile Gunn's death is unfortunate, it's also true that
quite a number of babies' lives will be saved." Rohter, supra note 115. Randall Terry
remarked that "[while] we grieve for him and for his widow and for his children, we must also
grieve for the thousands of children that he has murdered." The Death of Dr. Gunn, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 1993, at A28. Matt Trewhella, of "Missionaries to the Unborn," said he
"would not condemn someone who killed Hitler's doctors who committed atrocities against
human beings, and neither [would he] condemn Michael Griffin." Anthony Lewis, Abroad at
Home; Right to Life, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1993, at A29.
117. Rohter, supra note 115.
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have taken place in the first two months of 1993.1' In February
1993, activists bombed a clinic in Corpus Christi, causing one million
dollars of damage.119
These incidents illustrate the kind of violence federal injunctions
are intended to prevent. The injunctions, however, are not designed
to silence anti-abortionists or limit their ability or right to protest
peacefully, but rather to stop them from violently interfering with the
rights of others.
B. The Inadequacy of State Remedies
The inability of state authorities to secure the rights of women to
choose abortion and the rights of the clinics to provide such services
serves as the reason behind the plaintiffs' pursuit of a federal remedy
instead of an action under state law. In NOW v. Operation Rescue, 2 '
the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia noted that
Operation Rescue was able to perpetrate its "rescue" "notwithstand-
ing the efforts of the [local] police department."' 2'
Typical of most "rescue" demonstrations, the rescuers outnum-
bered the Falls Church police officers on the scene that day. Even
though 240 rescuers were arrested, the police were unable to pre-
vent the closing of the clinic for more than six (6) hours. Limited
police department resources combined with the typical absence of
any advance notice identifying a target clinic renders it difficult for
local police to prevent rescuers from closing a facility for some
period of time.'22
The history of anti-abortion violence in Pensacola, Florida,
where Dr. Gunn was murdered, evidences the ineffectiveness of local
law enforcement in guaranteeing the safety of individuals in the face
of anti-abortion protest. Pensacola has a long history of anti-abortion
violence.' 23 In 1984, two doctors' offices and a clinic were bombed
by anti-abortion protesters.' 24 John Burt, a former Ku Klux
Klansman, 25 is the current regional director of Rescue America, the
group that Michael Griffin demonstrated with when he murdered Dr.
Gunn. Burt had been arrested in 1986 for his involvement in an inci-
dent in which he and other protesters entered a clinic, knocked down
118. Id.
119. Lewis, supra note 116.
120. 726 F. Supp. 1483 (E.D. Va. 1989), affid, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'd sub nom.
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
121. Id. at 1489.
122. Id.
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two employees, threw office equipment around, and upended
drawers. 2
6
Dr. Gunn knew of the dangers. 27 There were "wanted" posters
with his name on them, people following him late at night, hate mail,
and death threats.12 He "kept three guns in his car-one in the glove
compartment, one under the seat, and one in the trunk."'
129
Pro-life demonstrations clearly are not spontaneous tortious or
criminal acts occurring in the heat of the moment. In Women's
Health Care Services v. Operation Rescue-National,130 a case arising
out of Operation Rescue's demonstrations in Wichita, Kansas in the
summer of 1991, Judge Kelly recognized that the illegal acts were
organized and committed under the direction of Operation Rescue's
leaders.1 3 ' The demonstrations are specifically targeted to stymie
attempts by local authorities to uphold local laws of trespass, nui-
sance, and business interference. 32 The organization leaders typically
instruct the demonstrators on what actions to take in order to maxi-
mize police ineffectiveness. The demonstrators are told to go limp
126. Id.
127. Indeed, anti-abortion forces are now targeting doctors. "We've found that the weak
link is the doctor," Randall Terry commented at a recent Florida rally. "We're going to
expose them. We're going to humiliate them." Lewis, supra note 116.
128. Rimer, supra note 116.
129. Id.
130. 773 F. Supp. 258 (D. Kan. 1991).
131. Id. at 262. The court also noted the military nature of the demonstrations:
These leaders often wear distinctive clothing to assist in their control of the
protesting crowds. The leaders communicate . . . by means of cellular
telephones .... hand radios, and... bullhorns .... To the extent that they are
identifiable by the court, all of the leaders supervising the operations of the
tortious and criminal actions appear to be national participants in Operation
Rescue and are not from Wichita; none of the site leaders are women.
Id.
132. Id. at 265-66.
The fact that anti-abortion demonstrators design their protest activity to render local
authorities powerless could be construed as a violation of the "Hindrance Clause" of
§ 1985(3), which prohibits conspiracies "for the purpose of preventing or hindering the
constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within
such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws." In Bray, Justices Stevens, O'Connor,
Souter, and Blackmun indicated that the facts supported a claim under the Hindrance Clause.
Bray, 113 S. Ct. 753, 768 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 804-05 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); id. at 777 (Souter, J., dissenting). The majority denied application of the
Hindrance Clause, stating that the claim had not been stated in the complaint, nor suggested
as an argument, by either party to the action. Id. at 764. After the case had been held over for
reargument, the plaintiffs tried to brief the "Hindrance Clause" argument. Their motion was
denied. Even if it had been argued, however, the majority concluded that such a claim would
not be viable, because the class-based animus requirement and the state action requirement
had not been met, and because the district court did not find that the demonstrators' purpose
had been to prevent or hinder law enforcement. Id. at 464-67.
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when the police try to lead them away from the clinic."I
"[R]emember, you do not have a name until we tell you you have a
name," Terry yelled to protesters through a bullhorn at a 1989 dem-
onstration in Los Angeles, which Terry dubbed "The Holy Week of
Rescue."1 34 Once the protesters are dragged to vehicles and trans-
ported to jail they steadfastly refuse to give their names to officials,
leaving authorities unable to process them. Terry's plan is to crowd
already overcrowded local jails with his followers, further burdening
local law enforcement.1 35  In fact, Operation Rescue specifically
targets towns and cities whose jails are particularly overcrowded.136
Even if the police are able to process the demonstrators for violations
of state and local law, the sheer numbers of violators often serve only
to clog the court systems and further obstruct the legal process. 37
Even if law enforcement authorities were able to process the
large numbers of violators involved in the anti-abortion demonstra-
tions, sometimes law enforcement officials themselves are sympathetic
to Operation Rescue's efforts and refuse to process them. In some
instances, law enforcement authorities are unwilling to enforce state
and local ordinances which the demonstrators flagrantly violate. In
an extreme example, the chief of police in a small North Dakota town
was one of the twenty-four members of the Lambs of Christ, an anti-
abortion protest group, and was arrested for criminal trespass and
other charges during a demonstration outside the Women's Health
Organization in Fargo, North Dakota, on May 31, 1991.138 In
another demonstration, in Dobbs Ferry, New York, on October 29,
1988, police expressly agreed that no demonstrators would be arrested
so long as they agreed to leave the site by noon.139 In Buffalo, New
York, Mayor James Griffin invited Operation Rescue protesters to his
city, as a way of advancing his anti-abortion platform."4
The fact that governmental authorities themselves are acting in
complicity with anti-abortion protesters portends a lenient attitude
133. Faludi, supra note 99. The demonstrators' adherence to this command is evidenced by




136. Robert Abrams, Klan Act Is a Tool for Today, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 10, 1992, at 15-16.
137. Barringer, supra note 10.
138. Police Chief Fired for Protesting Loses Appeal, CHi. TRIB., Sept. 18, 1991, at 3.
Although the police chief was fired because he was jailed for his participation in the protest,
the incident illustrates the degree to which local officials are suspect in their role to enforce
local law when the violators are proponents of a particular political platform.
139. New York State NOW v. Terry, 704 F. Supp. 1247, 1260 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
140. Mimi Hall, Buffalo Awaits Abortion Battle: Some Fear a Replay of Wichita, USA
TODAY, Feb. 19, 1992 at 4A.
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toward the pro-lifers' law-breaking activities. It also sends a message
to local police, which may affect the fervor with which they enforce
local law. Indeed, in Buffalo, Mayor Griffin's invitation to Operation
Rescue had the New York state attorney general, Robert Abrams,
and pro-choice leaders concerned that Griffin's city-run police would
be lax in enforcing the court injunction that keeps protesters away
from clinics. 41
The analogy between the attack on abortion rights by Operation
Rescue and the Reconstruction activities of the Ku Klux Klan bears
repeating. The impetus behind the passing of the Ku Klux Klan Act
by the forty-second Congress was recognition on the part of President
Grant and members of Congress that certain authorities in Southern
states were unable, and often unwilling, to uphold the constitutional
rights of newly-freed slaves in the South.142 Similarly, on the abortion
front, there are local governmental authorities who are either over-
whelmed by the mob tactics of Operation Rescue or who are in fact
sympathetic to their cause and therefore refuse to bring police author-
ity to bear against the lawbreakers. It is in just such a situation where
the § 1985(3) remedy is appropriate and necessary.
IV. ABORTION CASES IN COURT
Operation Rescue makes no attempt to work through the polit-
ical system to achieve its anti-abortion aims, apparently preferring to
battle the abortion issue at the clinics and, consequently, in the courts.
The organization scorns political discourse, referring to those who
seek to outlaw abortion through lawful means as "wimps for life."'' 4
3
It is this sort of purposeful defiance of the legal and political system
that overwhelms local authorities and mandates the intervention of
the federal courts' broad injunctive powers. Indeed, even armed with
federal injunctive orders enforceable through federal marshals, clinics
and their patrons are hard pressed to stop a "rescue" once it has
begun, much less prevent one of the unannounced demonstrations
from happening. Randall Terry has candidly stated his aim of
"fac[ing] down" federal courts issuing injunctions.' 44
141. Id.
142. See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
143. Brief for the Respondents at 20, Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct.
753 (1993) (No. 90-985).
144. See New York State NOW v. Terry, 704 F. Supp. 1247, 1253 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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A. Cases in the Federal Circuits
Prior to Bray, the federal circuits were split on several issues
dealing with § 1985(3) in the abortion blockade context.
With the exception of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, all of the
circuits deciding the issue found that a protected class was involved in
the abortion protest cases. However, the courts differed on exactly
how the class should be defined. 145
The circuits have also differed as to which, if any, constitutional
right is violated in the abortion blockade cases. In bringing § 1985(3)
claims, clinics generally rely on violations of both the right to an abor-
tion and the right to interstate travel. However, the right to abortion
is problematic in that it is based on the right of privacy, emanating
from the Fourteenth Amendment concept of due process, which
requires affirmative state action. ' 46
Clearly, Operation Rescue does not work its deprivations under
"color of state law"; if it did, the clinics would have a cause of action
under § 1983,147 and there would be no need to prove the conspiracy
element of § 1985(3).148 However, clinics have attempted to predicate
the claim on police inaction or protesters' interference with the
145. Volunteer Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 948 F.2d 218 (6th Cir. 1991)
(gender is an immutable characteristic warranting the consideration of women as a protected
class under § 1985(3)); New York State NOW v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 495 U.S. 947 (1990) (women [seeking abortions] are protected class); NOW v.
Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582, 585 (4th Cir. 1990) (women seeking abortions are protected
class), rev'd sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
Contra Lucero v. Operation Rescue of Birmingham, 954 F.2d 624 (1 1th Cir. 1992) (women
seeking abortions are not a protected class); Mississippi Women's Medical Clinic v. McMillan,
866 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1989) (same); Roe v. Abortion Abolition Soc'y, 811 F.2d 931 (5th Cir.
1987) (persons who disagree with anti-abortion protestors do not form a class).
For a discussion of how the federal district courts have treated the issue, see Women's
Health Care Servs. v. Operation Rescue-Nat'l, 773 F. Supp. 258 (D. Kans. 1991) (conspiracy
motivated by gender-based animus is actionable); see also Planned Parenthood v. Doe, No. 90-
CV-1084, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13063, at *48 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1991) (women seeking
abortions are a protected class); Roe v. Operation Rescue, 710 F. Supp. 577 (E.D. Pa. 1989)
(same), affl'd on other grounds, 919 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1990); Cousins v. Terry, 721 F. Supp.
426, 430 (N.D.N.Y. 1989) (same); Portland Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Advocates for
Life, 712 F. Supp. 165, 169 (D. Or.) (same), a ffd on other grounds, 859 F.2d 681 (9th Cir.
1988).
146. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The decision in Roe and its foundation in the right
of privacy have been criticized by commentators on both sides of the abortion issue. Pro-life
activists note that a "right of privacy" does not exist in explicit terms in the Constitution and
that its existence is due to judicial activism. Pro-choice activists note the weakness of basing a
fundamental right to abortion on a right to privacy and suggest that an equal protection
argument would be stronger and more stable. See generally Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe
v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569 (1979).
147. See supra notes 68-72.
148. Id.
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police's ability to keep order on the scene. Lower courts have differed
on whether enough state involvement was present in the abortion
clinic cases, based on police inaction or hindrance, to support a claim
for a violation of the right to an abortion, but most have found that
state action was not involved. 49
Some courts have concluded that by actively preventing law
enforcement officials from effectively guaranteeing the rights of the
clinics and their patrons, Operation Rescue's actions fulfill the "state
involvement" requirement of § 1985(3)."15 In New York State
National Organization for Women v. Terry,'' the District Court
found that Operation Rescue, by blocking abortion clinics in large
numbers and by refusing to notify police of their targets, acted to
render police ineffective and, therefore, satisfied § 1985(3)'s state
action requirement.'52 In Women's Health Care Servs. v. Operation
Rescue-National, the District Court found that because Operation
Rescue had purposefully interfered with the ability of police to pro-
tect the rights of the plaintiffs, it satisfied the state action
requirements. 153
Some courts have been less receptive to this approach to state
149. See, e.g., Volunteer Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 948 F.2d 218, 227 (6th
Cir. 1991) (intent to overwhelm authorities insufficient state action); Lucero v. Operation
Rescue of Birmingham, 772 F. Supp. 1193, 1198 (N.D. Ala. 1991) (no evidence of state
action), affid on other grounds, 954 F.2d 624 (11th Cir. 1992), reh'g denied, 961 F.2d 224
(1992); Upper Hudson Planned Parenthood, Inc. v. Doe, No. 90-CV-1084 (1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13063), at *57 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1991) (failure to notify police of location of protest
not state action); National Abortion Fed'n v. Operation Rescue, No. CV 89-1181 AWT, 1990
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1805 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 1990) (no state action); Roe v. Operation Rescue,
710 F. Supp. 577, 583 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (state involvement too limited to constitute state
action). Contra Women's Health Care Servs. v. Operation Rescue-Nat'l, 773 F. Supp. 258,
266 (D. Kan. 1991) (failure to inform police of location and use of overwhelming police
resources constitute sufficient state action); New York State NOW v. Terry, 704 F. Supp. 1247
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (failure to inform police of location and acts of police officials in not arresting
protesters if they left before noon); Portland Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Advocates for
Life, 712 F. Supp. 165 (D. Or. 1988) (evidence of attempt to influence government to restrict
abortion right sufficient).
150. Terry, 704 F. Supp. at 1260 (quoting Great Am. Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny,
442 U.S. 366, 384 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("If private persons take conspiratorial
action that prevents or hinders the constituted authorities of any state from giving or securing
equal treatment, the private persons would cause those authorities to violate the 14th
Amendment; the private persons would then have violated § 1985(3).").
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1260.
153. Women's Health Care Servs. v. Operation Rescue-Nat'l, 773 F. Supp. 258, 266 (D.
Kan. 1991).
1438 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1415
action."' In Volunteer Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Operation Rescue,53
the Sixth Circuit recently heard a clinic's § 1985(3) claim and deter-
mined that, absent a level of state action normally required by Four-
teenth Amendment analysis, 156 a § 1985(3) claim could not succeed if
based on a deprivation of the right to choose an abortion. The Court
reconciled its decision with the Second Circuit's decision in NOW v.
Terry ' by saying that the evidence in Terry "suggested a level of
state involvement not present in the instant case."' 58 The Sixth Cir-
cuit presumably relied on the allegation in Terry that the police in
Dobbs Ferry, New York agreed not to arrest protestors provided they
leave before noon. 59 Because most of these cases do not involve such
an overt arrangement between the police and the protesters, the claim
based on the right to abortion seems tenuous at best, in light of the
Court's interpretation of the right to an abortion.' 60 The right to
travel has proven a more successful approach to the abortion block-
ade cases under § 1985(3).161
154. See Upper Hudson Planned Parenthood, Inc. v. Doe, No. 90-CV-1084, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13063, at *57 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1991) (rejecting rationale that failure to notify
police constituted state action); NOW v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1493 n. 11
(E.D. Va. 1989) (finding "doubtful" the argument that the state action requirement is satisfied
when "rescuers" refuse to notify the police of their next "rescue" target, thereby rendering
police incapable of securing equal access to medical treatment for women seeking abortion).
155. 948 F.2d 218 (6th Cir. 1991).
156. See Luger v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
157. 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1989).
158. Volunteer Medical Clinic, 948 F.2d at 228-29.
159. Id. (citing New York State NOW v. Terry, 704 F. Supp. 1247, 1260 n.16 (S.D.N.Y.
1989)).
160. The Sixth Circuit also distinguishes the case of Women's Health Care Servs. v.
Operation Rescue, 773 F. Supp. 258 (D. Kan. 1991), noting that in that case "the court
indicated that police officers might have displayed an improper lack of zeal in defending the
legal rights of plaintiffs and their patients." Id. at 228.
161. See Planned Parenthood Ass'n of San Mateo Cty. v. Holy Angels Catholic Church,
765 F. Supp. 617, 625 (N.D. Cal. 1991); Upper Hudson Planned Parenthood, Inc. v. Doe, No.
90-CV-1084, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13063, at *53 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1991) (right to travel
claim stated); Cousins v. Terry, 721 F. Supp. 426 (N.D.N.Y. 1989) (right to travel violated);
New York State NOW v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1361 (2d Cir. 1989); NOW v. Operation
Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1493 (E.D. Va. 1989) (large percentage of patients from out-of-
state), affid, 914 F.2d 582, 584 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'd sub nom Bray v. Alexandria Women's
Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993); Roe v. Operation Rescue, 710 F. Supp. 577, 582 (E.D. Pa.
1989) (one out-of-state patient denied access violates right to travel), aff'd on other grounds,
919 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1990); Portland Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Advocates for Life,
Inc., 712 F. Supp. 165, 168 (D. Or. 1988) (conspiracy to deter women from traveling from out-
of-state to seek abortion). But see Lucero v. Operation Rescue of Birmingham, 772 F. Supp.
1193 (N.D. Ala. 1991) (1.5% out-of-state patients insufficient to implicate the right to travel),
affid on other grounds, 954 F.2d 624 (11 th Cir. 1992).
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B. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic
The facts of Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic provide a
vivid example of how serious a threat pro-life forces pose to the law
and order of the cities it targets. In Bray, Terry and his followers held
clinics hostage for hours at a time over a one-week period.162
Operation Rescue argues that state remedies are adequate and
appropriate in these cases. In Bray, Operation Rescue argued that the
suit involved "a simple trespass action," 16 3 redressable through state
law. The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia saw the
case differently:
"Rescuers" did more than trespass on to the clinic's property and
physically block all entrances and exits. They also defaced clinic
signs, damaged fences and blocked ingress into and egress from the
Clinic's parking lot by parking a car in the center of the parking lot
entrance and deflating its tires. On this and other occasions, "res-
cuers" have strewn nails on the parking lots and public streets
abutting the clinics to prevent the passage of any cars."'
The district court noted that the purpose of the rescue demon-
strations is to disrupt operations at the clinics and ultimately to
"cause the clinic to cease operations entirely."'6 5 The court found
that such efforts create "a substantial risk that a clinic's patients may
suffer physical and mental harm . . . (i) to women with abortions
scheduled for that time, (ii) to women with abortion procedures...
already underway and (iii) to women seeking counseling concerning
the abortion decision." 166 Thus, the court found the demonstrations
to be more than "simple trespass," and issued a protective
injunction. 167
The district court concluded that "women seeking abortions and
counselling at abortion clinics are likely to suffer irreparable physical
and emotional damage as a result of defendants' [activities]"1 68 and
therefore enjoined Operation Rescue from "trespassing on, blockad-
ing, impeding or obstructing access to or egress from" abortion clinics
162. See NOW v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. at 1490.
163. Brief of Petitioners, Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Center, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993)
(No. 90-985). The facts of Bray militate against Operation Rescue's characterization of the
issue as "simple trespass"; the incident involved the violation of private property rights by
hundreds of screaming demonstrators who blocked doorways and parking lots for week-long
demonstrations, where, for many hours, police were powerless to prevent the demonstrations.
Id. at 770 (Souter, J., dissenting) and 780-821 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
164. NOW v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. at 1489-90.
165. Id. at 1488.
166. Id. at 1489.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1496.
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in the Metropolitan Washington area. ' 69 The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed.170
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Fourth
Circuit and denied the clinics' claim. Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, held that § 1985(3) did not provide a federal cause of action
against clinic blockaders. The Court's holding rested on the following
determinations: (1) that "women seeking abortions" do not constitute
a class protected under § 1985(3);171 (2) that the abortion demonstra-
tions did not reflect an animus directed at women generally, but was
instead directed at the practice of abortion; 72 (3) that abortion block-
aders' activities did not infringe upon women's right to travel because
such an infringement was not the blockaders "predominant pur-
pose"; 173 (4) that even if it had been their "predominant purpose," the
right to travel was not implicated because the blockaders did not erect
"actual barriers to interstate movement," but were "purely intrastate
restrictions" that affected intrastate travelers as well as interstate trav-
elers; 174 and finally, (5) that the clinics could not base their claims on
the deprivation of the right to abortion, because that right is only
protectable against state interference and not against a private
conspiracy. 175
1. THE CLASS-BASED ANIMUS REQUIREMENT: WOMEN AS A
PROTECTED CLASS
The first issue Justice Scalia addressed in the Bray opinion was
whether a protected class had been harmed by the blockades. In prior
cases, the Supreme Court has expressly left open the question of
whether § 1985(3) reaches private conspiracies directed at classes
other than those defined racially. 76 Operation Rescue tried to take
advantage of this gap in the Supreme Court's civil rights jurispru-
dence and alleged that § 1985(3) was only intended to protect against
racially motivated discrimination. 77
Part of the problem, which inures to the benefit of Operation
169. Id. at 1497.
170. NOW v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990).
171. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753, 764 (1993).
172. Id. at 762.
173. Id. at 762-63.
174. Id. at 763.
175. Id. at 764.
176. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 n.9 (1982).
177. NOW v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1492 (1989).
While the Supreme Court has left the question open, the majority of circuits have found
that the classes protected by § 1985(3) are not limited to those involving race. See supra note
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Rescue, is that women are not afforded the same strict scrutiny
required by "suspect class" status assigned to racial groups, but
instead occupy a middle ground known as "quasi-suspect," requiring
intermediate scrutiny."" Operation Rescue argues that under
§ 1985(3) gender groups do not merit the same constitutional protec-
tions as racial classes.179 However, another section of the Ku Klux
Klan Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, has not been restricted in the way Opera-
tion Rescue suggests. 180 Courts have interpreted § 1983 as protecting
a broad spectrum of classifications other than race, including
women. 181 Furthermore, a majority of the Circuits have found
women to be a class falling within the purview of statutory protection
for purposes of § 1985(3).182
The legislative history of the Ku Klux Klan Act itself supports
the notion that women as a class may have been foreseen as potential
beneficiaries of the new civil rights legislation.18 3 Representative Shel-
labarger, the proponent of the amended section, stated that "the
object" was "the prevention of deprivations which shall attack the
178. Classifications based upon gender merit "quasi-suspect status" justifying an
intermediate standard of review to determine whether the classification bears a close and
substantial relationship to an important government interest. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976) ("classifications by gender must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives"); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682-88 (1973) (applying strict scrutiny to sex based classification);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971) (giving mandatory preference to one sex over the
other is arbitrary). Perhaps the Supreme Court's position reflects the fact that even Supreme
Court Justices are not free from gender bias. See Sunstein, supra note 45, at 29-40 (discussing
the possibility that the Supreme Court has relied on constitutionally impermissible gender
stereotypes in its abortion decisions).
179. Brief for the Petitioners Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753
(1993) (No. 90-985).
180. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The original Ku Klux Klan Act, guarantees, in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
181. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (holding that
single sex admissions practice violated the Equal Protection Clause); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976) (holding that gender-based differential in state statute violated the equal protection
rights of young men); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (ruling that state statute's mandate of
appointing males as administrators of estates violated the Equal Protection Clause).
182. Volunteer Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 948 F.2d 218, 225 (6th Cir. 1991);
Lewis v. Pearson Found., Inc., 908 F.2d 318, 325-26 (8th Cir. 1990); New York State NOW v.
Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1358-59 (2nd Cir. 1989); NOW v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582, 585
(4th Cir. 1990); Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422, 1434 (7th Cir. 1988); Stathos v. Bowden, 728
F.2d 15, 20-21 (1st Cir. 1984); Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 623 F.2d 1060, 1066 (5th Cir.
1980); Life Ins. Co. of N. America v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499, 505 (9th Cir. 1979).
183. CONG. GLOBE, supra note 34, at 478.
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equality of rights of American citizens."1 14 Representative Perce said
that Congress sought to protect the rights of "citizens throughout the
entire country, without regard to the condition, race, or party affilia-
tion of the individual citizen. '"183 Representative Lowe commented
that protection is to be given to "all classes in all states; to persons of
every complexion and of whatever politics."' 6 Perhaps most telling,
Representative Buckley stated that "[t]he proposed legislation ... is
not to protect Republicans only in their property, liberties, and lives,
but Democrats as well, not the colored only, but the whites also; yes,
even women . "187
2. OPPOSITION TO ABORTION AS DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST WOMEN
On the basis of the legislative history of § 1985(3) and judicial
interpretation of § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment, the plain-
tiffs in Bray argued that women as a class should be protected under
§ 1985(3). Justice Scalia evaded this logic by characterizing the issue
as whether "women seeking abortions" are a class worthy of protec-
tion under § 1985(3) and concluding they were not. Operation Res-
cue, supported by the Solicitor General for the United States as
amicus curiae,1 88 claimed that its anti-abortion blockades are not
directed at women as a class, but instead only at the small subset of
women seeking to exercise their right to seek abortions or related
services.' 89 Such an argument is tantamount to the Klan stating that
their activities were not directed at all Blacks but only those who
chose to exercise the right to vote.190
The majority rejected the contention that the abortion blockades
at issue in Bray constituted discrimination against women as a class.
Justice Scalia based this opinion on two observations: (1) that "the
characteristic that formed the basis of the targeting here was not
womanhood, but the seeking of abortion" for which targeting there
are "common and respectable reasons";19 and (2) that the sexually
184. Id. at 478.
185. Id. at 512.
186. Id. at 376.
187. Id. at App. 190.
188. Brief for the United States As Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 14, Bray v.
Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993) (No. 90-985).
189. Brief for Petitioners at 15-16, Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct.
753 (1993) (No. 90-985).
190. See, e.g., Volunteer Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 948 F.2d 218, 224-25
(6th Cir. 1991); New York State NOW v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339 (2nd Cir. 1989); Robert
Abrams, 1871 Statute Can Control Operation Rescue Group, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 29, 1992, at 39.
191. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 761 n.4.
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discriminatory effect that the demonstrations have on women was not
enough to implicate a class-based animus, which requires a "sex-based
intent."1 92
In support of his first point, Justice Scalia noted that the defend-
ants must be shown to have been motivated by a "purpose that
focuses upon women by reason of their sex, '193 which he found not to
be the case in the abortion protest context. He found that opposition
to abortion, because it is "common and respectable," is not an "irra-
tional surrogate for opposition to (or paternalism toward) women."' 1 94
There are at least two counterarguments to the majority's reason-
ing. First, opposition to abortion, especially involving a violent inter-
ference with a woman's right to choose an abortion, is discrimination
against women. 95 Under the rubric of equal protection, opposition to
abortion advocates the "cooptation of women's bodies for the protec-
tion of fetuses," '96 where no similar obligation exists for men. As
Cass Sunstein notes in his article Neutrality in Constitutional Law:
abortion should be seen not as murder of the fetus but instead as a
refusal to continue to permit one's body to be used to provide
assistance to it. The failure to see it in this way is simply a product
of the perceived naturalness of the role of women as childbearers-
whether they want to assume that role or not.197
Following Professor Sunstein's reasoning, the majority's determina-
tion that opposition to abortion is "common and respectable" is based
on "constitutionally unacceptable stereotypes about women's natural
or appropriate role." 198
The second counterargument to the Court's ruling that abortion
protest is not discriminatory against women is the one the plaintiffs
offered in Bray and Justice Stevens espoused in his dissent. Stevens
wrote:
even assuming that the ultimate and indirect consequence of peti-
tioners' blockade was the legitimate and nondiscriminatory goal of
saving potential life .... the conspirators' immediate purpose was
to affect the conduct of women. Moreover, petitioners target
women because of their sex, specifically, because of their capacity
to become pregnant and to have an abortion. 199
192. Id. at 760-61 n.3.
193. Id. at 759.
194. Id. at 760.
195. See Sunstein, supra note 45; see generally Regan, supra note 146.
196. Sunstein, supra note 45, at 31.
197. Id. at 32.
198. Id. at 35.
199. Bray, 113 S. Ct. 753, 787 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
19931 1443
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1415
To support its claim that it does not discriminate against women
as a class, Operation Rescue argued that "rescues" seek to prevent
any individual, male or female, from participating in the abortion pro-
cess, whether as a recipient or as a practitioner.2 "° In addition, they
pointed to their female membership as evidence that they do not
discriminate.2 10
However, these assertions indicate that both Justice Scalia and
Operation Rescue have misconstrued the class-based animus require-
ment under § 1985(3). There is no requirement that any particular
number of women must be affected by a conspiracy in order to render
it gender discrimination or that only women are harmed by such a
202conspiracy. Operation Rescue is attempting to prevent women
from exercising a constitutionally-protected right, one that only
women can exercise, and that in itself discriminates against women as
a class.20 3 The fact that women choose or are convinced to participate
in such an effort to deny other women the exercise of a constitutional




The majority in Bray also denied the plaintiffs' claims under
§ 1985(3) because the right to travel was not implicated and because
the right to abortion is only protected against state action. NOW had
sought to avoid the requirement of "state involvement" 205 by alleging
200. There is, however, conflicting evidence on this point. In Women's Health Care Serv.
v. Operation Rescue-Nat'l, the court states:
While Operation Rescue has not prevented male patients from entering the
clinics, it has prevented female patients from entering the clinics, even when the
purpose of entering the clinic was not abortion-related. One of the videotapes
reveals an incident in which a prospective patient at the clinic on Central Avenue
was cut by glass thrown on the sidewalk by Operation Rescue protesters. The
victim had to be transported elsewhere for medical attention, since the protestors
would not allow her to enter the clinic for treatment of the laceration.
773 F. Supp. 258, 264 n.4 (D. Kan. 1991).
201. Brief for Petitioners at 11, Bray v. Alexandria Women's Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993)
(No. 90-985).
202. Women's Health Care Servs. v. Operation Rescue-Nat'l, 773 F. Supp. at 265;
Volunteer Medical Clinic, Inc v. Operation Rescue, 948 F.2d 218, 225 (6th Cir. 1991); New
York State NOW v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1359-60 (2nd Cir. 1989).
203. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 787 n.20, quoting Sunstein, supra note 45, at 32-33.
204. Brief for Respondents at 31 n.44, Bray (No. 90-985).
205. See supra notes 79-98 and accompanying text. Recall that in Griffin v. Breckenridge,
403 U.S. 88 (1971), the Court dispensed with the "state action" requirement erroneously
imposed by Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951). However, in Griffin the Court stated
that where the right sought to be protected was only protected by the Constitution insofar as it
was infringed upon by state action, some measure of "state involvement" must be proven in
order to be actionable under § 1985(3).
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a violation of not only a woman's right to abortion but also of her
right to travel,2 "e a right guaranteed as incident to U.S. citizenship
against both private and governmental deprivation.2 "7 However, in
Bray, the majority denied both of these claims.
a. The Right to Travel
The majority in Bray rejected the plaintiffs' right to travel claim.
Justice Scalia wrote that the plaintiffs had not shown that the anti-
abortion protesters' actions were intended to deprive women of their
right to travel.208  "[I]t does not suffice for application of § 1985(3)
that a protected right be incidentally affected. . . . [The defendant]
must act at least in part for the very purpose of producing [the depri-
vation]. ''209 The majority relied on the 1966 case of United States v.
Guest,2t ° which dealt with 18 U.S.C. § 241, a criminal conspiracy
statute.2 1' In Guest, the Court inferred a "strict scienter" require-
ment into the criminal statute, which includes an "unequivocal
'intent' requirement. ' 21 2 Justice Scalia equated § 1985(3)'s require-
ment of "purpose" with 18 U.S.C. § 241's requirement of "intent"
and concluded intent was lacking in the clinics' claim.21 a
In addition to finding no intent to deprive women of their right
to interstate travel, Justice Scalia noted that the claim that the right to
travel had been violated failed for another reason: no "actual barriers
to movement" were erected by the defendants, other than those that
affected both interstate and intrastate travelers.214 These barriers
206. Although the right to travel has proven to be a more successful basis on which to
establish a § 1985(3) claim than the right to abortion, it does little to strengthen the right to
abortion in the court system. Therefore, plaintiff clinics and NOW have clearly chosen to use
the right to travel as a fallback position.
207. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. at 105 (Burton, J., dissenting) (1976) ("the right
of interstate travel is constitutionally protected, does not necessarily rest on the Fourteenth
Amendment, and is assertable against private as well as governmental interference."); see, e.g.,
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (right to travel basis for federal action based on
counterpart statute to § 1985(3), when statute not primarily intended to protect the right to
travel); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenback v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (right to travel sufficient basis for suits under Civil Rights Act
of 1964, where statute not primarily intended to protect the right to travel).
208. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 762.
209. Id. at 762-63.
210. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
211. Justice Scalia mistakenly refers to § 241 as the "criminal counterpart" of § 1985(3).
Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 762. As Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent, the criminal counterpart
of § 1985(3) was deemed unconstitutional over a century ago in United States v. Harris, 106
U.S. 629 (1883). Id. at 793; see supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
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would not suffice to sustain a violation of the right to travel unless
"applied discriminatorily against [interstate travelers]. 21 5
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, emphasized Justice Scalia's mis-
reading of the Guest case and criticized his approach to the right to
travel:
Discrimination is a necessary element of the class-based animus
requirement, not of the abridgement of a woman's right to engage
in interstate travel .... The Reconstruction Congress would have
been startled, I think, to learn that § 1985(3) protected freed slaves
and their supporters from Klan violence.., only if the Klan mem-
bers spared local African-Americans and abolitionists their wrath.
And it would have been shocked to learn that its law offered relief
from a Klan lynching of an out-of-state abolitionist only if the
plaintiff could show that the Klan specifically intended to prevent
his travel between the States.21 6
b. The Right to an Abortion
Justice Scalia found further that the right to abortion is "an inad-
equate basis for respondents' § 1985(3) claim" because the right exists
only against state interference and "cannot be the object of a purely
private conspiracy.1 2 7 The majority supported this finding by noting
that the right to abortion is part of a right of privacy "much less
explicitly protected by the Constitution than, for example, the right of
free speech .... ,,2" Therefore, according to Justice Scalia, the claim
of a violation of the right to an abortion could not support the clinics'
§ 1985(3) claim absent official state action.
As discussed previously, 21 9 although affirmative state action
under traditional Fourteenth Amendment due process analysis is
absent in the abortion blockade context, it would be an overstatement
to say that the state is not involved where there is police inaction or
abortion protesters' interference with police effectiveness on the scene
of a protest. Furthermore, the federal government has taken an active
role in supporting the pro-life movement generally and the clinic
blockade context specifically. Former President Bush, while ostensi-
bly denouncing Operation Rescue's law breaking activity,220 fre-
quently voiced his strong anti-abortion views, indirectly condoning
215. Id.
216. Id. at 795 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 764.
218. Id. The right of free speech was found to be an inadequate basis for a § 1985(3) claim
in United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott, 463 U.S. 822 (1983); see supra notes 78-98 and
accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 63-73 and accompanying text.
220. Bush Admonishes Abortion Protesters: 'Abide by the Law,' N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1991,
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the efforts of Randall Terry and his zealots. Furthermore, while Bush
suggested to the protesters that they "abide by the law," the Justice
Department supported Operation Rescue in federal courts by submit-
ting amicus curiae briefs in two cases where Operation Rescue had
been sued under § 1985(3).22' When Judge Kelly issued a temporary
restraining order in Wichita, Kansas during Operation Rescue's
"Summer of Mercy," the Justice Department filed motions in support
of lifting the court order.22 2 The order was intended to stop the viola-
tions of state and local law. The Justice Department also submitted
the same amicus curiae brief to the United States Supreme Court in
Bray.2 23 These examples of the federal government's activity in the
abortion arena illustrate that the state is not a disinterested observer
of the conspiracy.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court gave women's rights a mighty shove back-
ward with its decision in Bray.224  Although Roe v. Wade is not
directly implicated, the decision for Operation Rescue may have far
reaching consequences, insofar as it permits private individuals to pre-
vent women from exercising their right to choose abortion, where
such a prevention by the state would be unconstitutional. Essentially,
it would amount to a back door assault on the protections of Roe.
The abortion debate, emotionally charged on both sides, has lead
to extreme behavior from both the pro-choice and the pro-life sides.
Huge demonstrations, barrages of literature, and hours of media cov-
erage add fuel to the fire as the Supreme Court comes closer to recon-
sidering Roe v. Wade, at least indirectly.
However, the abortion issue and the attendant moral dilemmas
for both choice proponents and right to life activists have little to do
with the justness of the abortion clinic violence. Regardless of
whether Operation Rescue is correct in its assertion that abortion
at All. Mr. Bush reportedly refused to interrupt his vacation in Kennebunkport, Maine to
meet with Randall Terry and another leader of Operation Rescue, Rev. Patrick J. Mahoney.
221. The Justice Department filed amicus briefs in both Bray and in Women's Health Care
Servs. v. Operation Rescue-Nat'l, 773 F. Supp. 258 (D. Kan. 1991).
222. U.S. Backs Wichita Abortion Protesters, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1991, at A10. This
article mentions that although the presiding judge granted the United States' request for
permission to file an amicus curiae brief on behalf of Operation Rescue, he said "I am
disgusted by this move by the United States" and recommended that then-Attorney General
Richard Thornburgh review videotapes of Operation Rescue's Wichita activities to understand
the "mayhem and distress" that had been unleashed on the city.
223. Brief For the United States As Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Bray v.
Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993) (No. 90-985).
224. 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
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ends human life, such does not justify the violent deprivation of the
civil rights of others. There are legitimate and constitutionally-
authorized political mechanisms that pro-life supporters have
employed in attempting to sway the legislature, both local and
national, to enact laws sympathetic to their cause. Their inability to
do so successfully should not justify their pursuit of illegal means to
try and force their perspective on others through violence and intimi-
dation. The Ku Klux Klan tried this in the late nineteenth century
and was made to answer for its behavior in the federal courts of the
United States, under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). The abortion clinic block-
aders should have been made to do the same.
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